Notion Of Change And Permanence In Aristotle

Notion Of Change And Permanence In Aristotle



1.1          INTRODUCTION

The sense of wonder is the mark of the philosophers.  Thus, according to Aristotle, “all men by nature desire to know”1.  On the same note, philosophically and otherwise, man has to give meaning to the mysteries befogging his finite nature.  Therefore it is not out of place that we are dragged into the concepts and facts of change and permanence.




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To the philosophers then, this omnipresent fact of change and permanence offered a paradoxical challenge stretching from the ancient Greek philosophy, through the medieval and modern, down the contemporary period.  Succinctly put, the problem of change and permanence is as old as philosophy itself hence according to Popkin, R.H:

Greek thinkers were impressed with the two basic features of the world, the occurrence of natural change and the continuance of certain apparently permanent conditions.2

The earliest Greek thinkers attempted to work out explanations of reality by asserting that underlying all the apparent changes; there is real, unchangeable element.  The motive behind this inquiry as highlighted by Mullin E. was that,

…If the many could be seen in some way as instances of one, it would then be sufficient to grasp the one.3

Thus reality is one thing, which however, appears in different guises at different times.

Against this background, some thinkers proceeded by way of action and reaction and delved into formulating theories in view of the enigma of change and permanence.  The problem they grappled with was prompted by fact of material change, and the principle they posited were arrived at through observation and thought. “For Thales, reality was water, for Anaximander, it was the ‘boundless’ or the infinite; and for Anaximanes, it was air.”4 In the history of Greek thought these earliest thinkers were called the pre-Socratics.  Referring to them, Copleston observed that,

…We can already discern in them the notion of unity in difference and of difference as entering into unity.5

Hence, Heraclitus consolidated change at the expense of permanence while Parmenides argued that, “absolute change is impossible and unthinkable and by nature things are permanent.”6 So for Heraclitus, all things flow; nothing abides, thus, “one cannot step twice in the same river”.7  Whereas Parmenides states that change, becoming or motion is impossible, because they would involve both non-being and being which being contradictories, cannot both be.  Thus, according to Parmenides, “Being is; non-being is not.”8 The position of these two champions gave rise to the great controversy on change and permanence, which arose as to how things can change and yet remain the same.  It was in an attempt to solve this ‘excruciating’ problem in philosophy that Aristotle came up with his principles of act and potency, Hylemorphism and categories (substance and Accidents).

However, in change what takes place is neither annihilation nor creation but transition of being from one state to another.  Wherever there is change, it presupposes the reality of that which changes.  Therefore, there is permanence and there is change.


The philosophical debate as to whether change or permanence will take the upper hand over the other is a problem that cannot be over looked in philosophical discipline at all times.  Hence, the problem at stake here is how true is it that what we call change really takes place? And why things will remain the same despite the occurrence of change?  This central question provoked many others, thus how can one and the same entity turn into that which it previously was not? If everything changes all the time, could there actually be any permanence, real, unchanging feature of the universe? And if reality were actually unchanging and unchangeable, how could it have any thing to do with the apparent world of change and how could it explain the world of change.

Commenting on this, Egbeke Aja states t

As early philosophers explored these problems, it seemed to them that change and permanence were incompatible, and that reality had to be one or the other, either ever changing or completely permanent.9

This originated because of the conflict between our sense perception and that made by the intellect.  The intellect sees reality as one while the senses grasp reality as many and always in flux.  But how can we reconcile this apparent contradiction between our sense perception of reality and that given by our intellect?

In all, two basic problems could be deduced from this topic, namely

  1. Must we take seriously both multiplicity and the oneness of being or can we affirm one aspect and dissolve the other as mere appearance, illusion, or projection of the mind?
  2. If we take both aspects seriously, how are they co-possible? What kind of unity is involved? How can the unity and diversity be harmonized?

Confronted with this philosophical problem of change, Aristotle posited his doctrine of act and potency, Hylemorphism and categories as a solution.  Thus, these doctrines arose as an attempt by Aristotle to provide a lasting solution to the problem of change and permanence, which had challenged philosophy for a century and a half.  But did he actually succeed? This is actually the problem that motivated this research.


It is the answer to these arrays of thought provoking questions that this paper is geared to find.  It is the search for the most fundamental truth about this world.  Truth about reality never completely manifests itself at an instance but through a process of gradual unfolding.  This paper inquires into the origin of the problem of change and permanence, and then will investigate the views offered by two great philosophers of timeless repute, Heraclitus and Parmenides. Further, it studies in a more detailed manner the solutions offered by one of the greatest genius, Aristotle.  Lastly, the tremendous impact of his thought on practical life will be viewed.


Cognizance of Aristotle’s vast contribution and discussion in philosophy, the scope of this study is based on his mediation on the problem of change and permanence.  His key concept to this realization is the unification of the Parmenidean and Heraclitean positions.  His notion of Act and potency, Hylemorphism and categories should be highlighted though in relation to Parmenides and Heraclitus’ perspectives.  To make the study scholarly and easy to comprehend, the nature of change and permanence are to be discussed.


The work is expository and analytic. Heraclitus’ and Parmenides’ concept of change and permanence shall be exposed with their views and reasons.  Then, in the light of these expositions, the notion of change and permanence in Aristotle’s perspective shall be analyzed.  In approaching this topic for a better apprehension, it is divided into four chapters.  Chapter one explicates the background, aim, scope, problem and method of the study.  In chapter two, the concepts of change and permanence, which will focus simply on the etymological derivation of the two terms and on their elucidation and explication, will be discussed.  The historical perspective of Parmenides and Heraclitus who were extremists in their treatment of the subjects of change and permanence will be viewed in the same chapter.  Chapter three deals with Aristotle’s mediation between the two positions with his doctrine of Act and Potency, matter and form (Hylemorphism), and substantial and accidental change (Categories).  In chapter four, the whole exposition will be evaluated which will also touch on the influence the resourcefulness of Aristotle’s philosophical mind had on the practical life.  This will be followed by a general conclusion.




For a profound internalization of this paper we shall start-off by making clear what we mean by the two key terms that make up our title.


From the etymological perspective, change is derived from Latin term ‘mutalia’ that connotes ‘to become something else’ or ‘to pass from one state to another’. A common idea about change therefore is that it involves shifting of place or position.  According to the New Webster Dictionary of English language “change is the alteration, exchange of things for another, the passing from one form to another.”[1]  Lottie, K., defined change as “the process by which things become different from what they were.”[2]

The manifestation and reality of change cannot be denied, even though some philosophers like Parmenides and his disciples have denied the notion of “change and diversity in the name of unity and immutability.”[3]  For him void or non-being does not exist at all.  Change is impossible because it would be a self-contradictory conversion of being into non-being.

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However, for Heraclitus, “becoming or change was seen as a quantitative one or as a transformation of one phase into another.”4  He maintained that, “all things are in a flux, nothing abides.”5

For Aristotle, “change is an immediate and undeniable basic fact of our experience.”6  Thus, change includes, motion, growth, decay, generation and corruption.  Following this line of thought, it can be deduced that all things are in the process of change. For instance, when a stick is put into the fire, it changes to ashes. This process of change implies that all things have the dynamic power of striving towards their end. Hence, this led him to consider the distinction between potency and act.  On this note Lottie, H.K., documented that:

…the place of change is the in-between state, which is neither the purely potential nor the purely actual. Change is the time of transition from what a thing is to what it can become.7

Change therefore is understood as imperfectly actualized potency or potentiality not fully actualized.

For Karl Marx, “history has shown that social and economic orders are in a process of change”8 The effect of his dialectical materialism was to show also that the material order is primary. It is the basis of what is truly real, there are no stable fixed points in reality because everything is involved in the dialectical process of change.  With this view, Marx has rejected the notion that somewhere there are stable, permanent structures of reality or certain eternal varieties.  He agreed with Engel that all in nature, “from the smallest thing to the biggest, from the grain of sand to the sun… to man, is in … a ceaseless state of movement and change.”9

Again he asserts that, History is the process of change from one epoch to another in accordance with the vigorous and inexorable laws of historical motion.  For Marx, change is not the same as mere growth.  A society does not simply mature the way a boy becomes a man.  Nor does maturity simply mean to move in an eternally uniform and constantly repeated circle.  For him then, “change is emergence of new structures, novel form.”10

Furthermore the law of change governs all finite realities.  For instance, water changes into steam or ice, metal melts and liquefies.  The experience of change, both substantial and accidental led to the minds discovery of distinction in objects between substance and accident of different kinds and also to the hylemorphic composition of material substance.

Therefore from all indications change is an undeniable reality in our world because we know that things change, the arrow flies, the animal runs, what was cold becomes hot under the action of fire, and what was living dies.

Finally, one who repudiates the fact and reality of change in the universe/cosmos; the occurrence of change must necessarily be made manifest to him.


The nature of change implies a presupposition of the reality of change itself that we have seen above.  Obviously change is among the fundamental facts of our experience and among the basic data of life and the universe.

When we talk of change then we find ourselves referring to the idea of something passing from one state to another.  Change evokes the idea of motion.  In fact, it is a kind of dynamism and as such we shall be using it interchangeably with motion or movement.  Again it is note worthy to state that the subjects of change are those substances that have privation and potency, while privation is a principle of change.  This indicates that change or movement is found only in finite things.  Since our changeable materials have privation and potency, it is necessary that we recourse to have a well rounded comprehension of the nature of change.

To be in movement is a process or transition from an incipient stage, the potency, to a final stage, the act.11

By potency we mean the power to cause the becoming of something actual, while act is “that which exists because it has been caused to be by whatever powers that caused it to come into being.”12  Something then is said to be undergoing a change or to be in motion when it is mid-way between potency and act; when it is partly in potency and partly in act; that is when it has left the state of potency and is steadily approaching the state of act.

According to the Aristotelian view, “things are potentially in motion but must be moved by something that is actually in motion.”13 Motion is the actuation of what is potential as potential, the actuation of an existent in potency, precisely as being actuated. From these perspectives, it is easily understood that motion is the composition of potency and act.  It is neither merely a question of potency nor of act.  Now examining the distinction between potency and act as “the power to cause which has not yet caused and the power to cause which has caused.”14 It is simply the actuation of the potentiality.  Change is rather associated with unperfected act that is ever tending towards further actuation.  Since what is actual could not have become actual without the power that caused it to be actual, thus,

In one-way, actuality is prior to potentiality and in another way potentiality is prior to actuality.15

Furthermore, movement takes place within different categories and as such distinction could be made of different kinds of movement or change.  Here, it is important to know that the goal of motion helps in determining what kind of movement it is.  The first kind of movement is local movement (change).  This involves change of place.  It is evident that things occupy different places; this local movement is required for their action upon one another. For example, like moving from Enugu to Lagos.

The second kind of change is quantitative change, which involves growth and diminution in things.  We have diminution when there is loss of matter and the movement from a perfect state to a less perfect state ensues.   The third kind of movement is qualitative change, which involves alteration that proceeds from the active qualities of things and produce similar qualities in other things.  Another kind of change is substantial change; it is the most radical kind of change and it involves the substantial form of the subject of change.  Substantial change could be directed either towards the generation of a thing or its corruption (destruction).  Following substantial change, substance is either produced (generation) or ceases to exist (corruption).  Here generation is the acquisition of a substantial form and corruption is the lost of substantial form.  Substantial change occurs then, when an element changes over another, for instance, when from seed new living beings are produced and when living being is destroyed.  Here, the production of one being signifies the destruction of another.


The word ‘permanence’ is derived from the Latin verb ‘pamanere’ signifying: ‘to remain to’ or to ‘subsist’.  In relation to change, a permanent element is the unchanging reality that passes in to the new thing that comes to be.  Put differently a permanent principle in motion is the underlying subsisting element that is not affected by fleeting circumstances.  A permanent factor in change thus constitutes a bond of union from the “terminus a quo to the terminus ad quem of the change.”16

As said above, change is an undeniable fact but within this change, there is permanence, or else everything would be in flux as Heraclitus maintained and this would be absurd.  In our world today, change presupposed permanence and vice versa.  Reality of permanence is manifested in many facets of life and by people in different areas of life especially philosophers.

Thales affirmed the reality of permanence in his postulation of “what is the single substance or the ultimate stuff”17out of which the material universe was made. Anaximander following his master propounded that the “boundless or the infinite” 18 is the basic stuff out of which everything comes.  That everything is derived from a single stuff; boundless/ infinite implies a real manifestation of permanence in nature.

Anaximenes in trying to solve the problem of permanence in nature affirms “air as the stuff”19 behind the coming to be of everything, thereby demonstrating the reality of permanence.

Parmenides in his affirmation of the fact or reality of permanence said that “being is, non-being is not.”20 Thus “the changing aspect cannot be part of existence, since it does not belong to the real unchanging aspect and must therefore be non-existence.”21 If they are, then they exist and are permanent, but if they are not, they do not exist.  Reality of permanence is manifested in the existence of things because if they exist, they must remain permanent because there is nothing like annihilation.  Moreover change is unreal because there is always a movement from being to being which entails no change and also since there is no movement from non-being to being, things remain permanent.

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Plato commenting on the reality of permanence maintains that, “in the changing of the elements, there is something that remains.”22  Hence, the previous attempts to characterize being were unduly restrictive: “those who say that being is a plurality or else that it is only one thing…are all rebuked for leaving something out of the inventory. Thus, being is whatever is changed and whatever is unchanged (permanent).”23 There is both change and permanence in reality.

Furthermore, change entails permanence not annihilation because being cannot be reduced to non-being.  In every change, there is always a relationship between the starting point and the end point.  If there is no relationship between them, then annihilation has taken place, which is absurd, but if there is any relation or semblance then permanence is realized.

Whitehead’s appreciation of the reality or fact of permanence is depicted in his citation of the two lines of the popular hymn.

Abide with me,

fast falls the eventide.

In elucidating this, he said,

Here the first line expresses the permanence, ‘abide’, ‘me’ and the ‘Being’ addressed, and the second line sets this permanence amid the inescapable flux… Those philosophers who started with the first line have given us the metaphysics of substance and those who started with the second line have developed the metaphysics of flux.24


However, to investigate properly the nature of permanence, it suffices for us to know exactly the context in which the word is used.  While some people (philosophers) view permanence in relation to change, others view it without any recourse to change at all, especially Parmenides.

Parmenides understood permanence within the context of being, for he said, “being is, non-being is not.”25 Here permanence is situated or located in the logical plane and is grounded by the principle of non-contradiction which says that a thing cannot be and not be at the same time.  Moreover, since nothing comes from nothing, it follows that being always comes from being; therefore there is permanence of being since the possibility of annihilation is eradicated.  This logical permanence presupposes the existence of the world from eternity without any tincture of creation.  Moreover, here the movement is from act to act or else there results are contradiction.

This type of logical permanence is contrary to the permanence found in nature through change.  Here the idea that being cannot come from non-being is retained but instead of movement from act to act, it is movement from potency to act- this is the position of Aristotle and St. Thomas.  We have, as it was, left the logical plane but now on the physical plane.  At this physical plane, it is inconceivable to think of permanence without change.  Confirming this view, Whitehead holds,

In the inescapable flux, there is something that abides; in the overwhelming permanence, there is an element that escapes into flux.  Permanence can be snatched only out of flux; and the passing moment can find its adequate intensity only by its submission to permanence.26

Change and permanence are intrinsically related and there is a kind of mutuality between the two especially as they presuppose a subject or object within which they must occur.  To explore the nature of permanence therefore, it must be within the context of the nature of change itself, precisely within the kinds of change.  Since change varies from one kind to another, and we said they imply each other, it follows that permanence varies from one kind to another.

In substantial change for instance, there is change of matter from one form to another.  Thus in the burning of a chair (wood) to form ashes, matter remains what it is because it can never be destroyed and this can be called absolute permanence because matter always is and it cannot be annihilated.  Here we are not talking of permanence in terms of a chair or the wood because the chair is gone but we are talking of the permanence of the intrinsic material aspect of the chair, which is matter.  This absolute permanence of Parmenides is that being cannot come from non-being and matter cannot come from non-matter.

Again accidental change is the change or the increment or diminishing either qualitatively or quantitatively of matter and form.  Here the form that went into the composition of the object remains the same but have increased or decreased in quantity or quality.  In this way therefore, we talk of permanence in terms of form.  For example, the boy changing or maturing to adulthood remains the same subject with his form intact irrespective of the physical (quantitative) or mental (qualitative) change.  It is because of the retention of this form that we can recognize John when he was a boy as the same person now he is a man.  This permanence is not absolute but relative.

We can also talk of the permanence (of matter and form) in the same state, mode, place, or location.  This is in terms of local motion or change; that is before changing place, while changing place and after changing place.  When not moved by itself or an external object, a body remains with itself, its matter and form, at the same place, state and mode.  But when moved, it still remains the same body with its matter and form complete and its qualitative and quantitative characteristics in tact, though changing position or location.  After change or movement it still retains those qualities though now in a new location or place.


The study of the Ancient philosophers thus, is quite essential and indispensable in this paper for F. Copleston, equally noted that,

…it would be absurd to start a history of Greek philosophy with a discussion of Socrates and Plato without any discussion of preceding thought, for we cannot understand Socrates or Plato or Aristotle either without a knowledge of the past.27

But for the brevity of this work, we shall, consider only the perspectives of Heraclitus and Parmenides who were so conspicuous that they went into extremes.  One affirms the reality of change and absolutely denying the reality of permanence, while the other affirms the reality of permanence and absolutely denying the reality of change.


Heraclitus, a native of Ephesus who lived around 500 B.C, deviated from the problem at stake during his time that is, “the stuff out of which things are made of ”28, to another problem, namely the problem of change.  He is popularly noted for his view that change is the law of nature and the condition of all things.  According to him, “all things are in the state of flux… you cannot step twice into the same river, for fresh rivers are ever flowing in upon you.”29 For him, reality is ever in constant tension.  Things come into being and pass away.  Nothing for him is stable or constant; everything is always in the process of change.  Heraclitus in describing change assumed that there must be something that changes and he argued that this something is fire.  What led him to posit fire was that fire behaves in such a way as to suggest how the process of change operates. Fire is thus from his own view, simultaneously a deficiency and a surplus; for it must constantly be fed and it constantly gives off something, either in the form of heat, smoke or ashes.  Fire is therefore a process of transformation whereby what is fed into it is transformed into something else.

According to Heraclitus also, not only is there perpetual change, there is also “perpetual struggle and strife”30, for the universe is a universe made up of conflict and clashes of opposites.  We are overwhelmed by the presence of good and evil and long for the peace that means the end of strife.  But Heraclitus sought to account for strife by saying that it is the very essence of change itself.  If we could visualize the whole process of change, we should know, according to Heraclitus, that “war is common and justice is strife and that all things happen by strife and necessity.” 31from this perspective, he says,

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What is in opposition is in concert, and from what differs comes the most beautiful harmony.32

Heraclitus emphasizes that the many find their unity in the one, so that what appear to be disjointed events and contradictory forces are in reality intimately harmonized.

Furthermore, the process of change is the production of God’s universal reason (Logos), and idea, which emanated from his religious conviction that soul is the most real thing of all, which has its most distinctive and vital separate personal entities.  For as far as Heraclitus is concerned, there is only one basic reality and that is fire it is this material substance fire, that he called the One or God.  Heraclitus was unavoidably a pantheist for all things were according to him God.  This implies that the soul of man is part of God for God is in everything.

God is reason and One, permeating all things.  Thus:

He is therefore the universal law immanent in all things, holding them in unity and orders all things to move and change in accordance with thought or principles, which constitute the essence of law.33

Furtherance to this, after an examination and consideration of the cosmic situation, Heraclitus minimized the permanence of being and emphasized the universality of becoming.  According to Heraclitus,

We meet a radical expression of the indubitable fact of change in our experiential universe.  Things flow, proceed, evolve, progress, come and go, originate and disappear.34

It can therefore be deduced that change for Heraclitus meant the coming into being and passing away of things in the universe.  Expressing Heraclitus line of thought, Copleston observed that:

…the idea of a material universe, in which organic life is present, demands change.  But change means diversity on the one hand for there must be a terminus a quo and a terminus ad quem of the change, and stability on the other hand, for there must be something that changes.  And so there will be identity in diversity.35


Parmenides who lived between sixth and seventh century B.C was from the city of Elea in southern Italy.  He was a younger contemporary of Heraclitus and the famous Eleatic school of philosophy is attributed to him as founder.  His philosophical teachings were chiefly a radical and strange interpretation of the phenomena of change.

The main doctrine of Parmenides is that change is simply an illusion of the senses, that being is one and unchanging.  There is no becoming, nothing comes into being and nothing goes out of being, being simply is and does not change.  There is no change in reality, whatever is, is and cannot become anything else.  Stumpf writes that,

…for Parmenides, the concept of change was logically neither thinkable nor expressible.  He maintained that whatever exists must be absolutely or not at all.  To exist in absolute way meant for Parmenides that whatever is simply is.  We can never admit, he said, that anything should come into being… out of not being.36

He thus rejected Heraclitus’ attempt to explain change as a unity in diversity and at the same time criticized the Milesian philosophers’ theories about the origin of things.  All previous systems had assumed the reality of change in the physical world and attempted to explain it.  Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximanes held that the world evolved from a simpler state into a more complex one.  Heraclitus apparently abandoned the idea of an original simple state, asserting that everything in the world is always changing, and an ever-living fire.

Parmenides’ critique was equally damaging to all of these theories.  He maintained that it cannot logically be true that a subject is and at the same time is not.  From this, Parmenides concluded that it cannot be true that a subject is black and at the same time is not black, or to say that a man is tall and short at the same time. Hence, all differentiation is impossible; this is because, for him, any differentiation would lead to self-contradiction. To prove this point with greater force, Parmenides tried to show the absurdity of the concept of becoming or change by drawing out the implication of saying that something comes to be either from the existing thing or non-existing thing.

Parmenides went on to ask this question, wherein lies the absurdity of saying that something comes into being? It lies, said Parmenides; in the impossibility of saying consistently or coherently that something can arise either out of being or out of non-being.  The assumption behind the concept of change, or of becoming is just this, “that something changes from non-being to being or from being to being”37 But for Parmenides, this assumption made no sense for the following reasons: “If one says that something arises out of being as Thales and other Milesians did, there cannot then be any coming-into-being, for, if it arises out of being, one assumes that non being is something”.38 But to say that non being is something is clearly a contradiction since everything has being.  Commenting on Parmenidean argument, Copleston, F., noted that for Parmenides, “Reality was not first possible nothing and then existent.  It was always existent.”39 Being for Parmenides is whole, complete and perfect.  It cannot therefore be conceived as expanding into space.  Being is thus irreducible and indestructible.  For him what is, is and what is not, is not, for change is basically an illusion; hence,

If the universe consisted of some permanent immutable base… then this constant element could not alter, move, divide, separate and so on, since any of these properties will indicate change40

The logical absurdity of the concept of change was not enough to dispel this concept from common sense.  Everywhere the average man sees things in flux, and to him this represents genuine change.  But Parmenides rejected the common-sense notion of change by his distinction between appearance and reality.  Change, he said, is the illusion of appearance.  What lay behind this distinction between appearance and reality was Parmenides’ important distinction between opinion and truth.  Appearance cannot produce more than opinion, whereas reality is the basis of truth.  Although common sense would say that things appear to be in flux and, therefore, in a continuous process of change, this opinion based on sensation must, says Parmenides, yield to the activity of reason, which is able to discern the truth about things, and reason tells us that, if there is a simple substance of which everything consists, then there can be no movement or change.  This view and notion nurtured by Parmenides about the senses agree with Frederick Copleston analysis that;

Change and movement are most certainly phenomena, which appear to the senses, so that in rejecting change and movement, Parmenides is rejecting the way of appearance41

No wonder most philosophers see Parmenides as the father of idealism, though this is not unanimous decision since the truth really seems to be that though Parmenides does assert to the distinction between reason and sense;

He asserts it not to establish an idealist system, but to establish a system of monistic materialism, in which change and movement are dismissed as illusory.  Only reason can apprehend reality, but the reality which reason apprehends is material.  This is not idealism but materialism.42

The logic of Parmenides’ argument then raises a fundamental problem – “whether we should accept the conclusion of apparently valid logical reasoning, or should give preference to the apparent evidence of experience, even if we cannot explain it consistently


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